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Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding: Why
Qualified Immunity Is a Poor Fit in Fourth Amendment
School Search Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Safford Unified School
District #1 v. Redding (“Safford”), 1 a case regarding the civil rights
standards to which lower-education school officials are held when they
conduct a search of a student’s property. In its only other Fourth
Amendment school search decision, the 1985 decision of New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 2 the Court applied a two-prong test, which was based on a mere
reasonableness standard or whether common sense was used by the
school official. 3 The Court adopted this standard so that educators would
not be required to remain well-versed on Fourth Amendment search and
seizure law, which is constantly in flux due to judicial decisions.
Regrettably, in Safford the Court failed to reiterate the mere
reasonableness standard and instead applied the more complex
reasonable suspicion standard. 4 While the Court did not explicitly do
this, a careful comparison of the two cases shows this is the most
reasonable understanding of Safford. This is unfortunate because, while
some may argue the standards are the same, reasonable suspicion is a
more complicated and case-law based standard than what the Court
described in T.L.O. Applying such a standard contradicts the policy of
T.L.O. that school officials should not be required to remain abreast of
changes in Fourth Amendment law. 5
Secondly, this was the Court’s first opportunity to apply both the
T.L.O. test and the qualified immunity standard in a school search case.
The mere reasonableness standard from T.L.O. makes qualified
immunity very difficult to apply because it looks to common sense and
not to current case law while, in contrast, qualified immunity considers
whether current case law has put the governmental actor on notice that
the action was unconstitutional. This is possibly the reason the Court
1. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
2. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
3. Arguably, the Court used reasonable suspicion rather than mere reasonableness in T.L.O.
For a discussion of why I conclude the Court established a mere reasonableness standard see infra
Part II.A.
4. 129 S. Ct. 2633.
5. 469 U.S. at 343.
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failed to utilize the mere reasonableness standard and relied on the
reasonable suspicion standard.
A likely result of Safford is that school officials now have more
protections than qualified immunity normally grants. I refer to this as
“qualified immunity plus.” After all, if the search that occurred in
Safford was not enough to overcome the qualified immunity defense, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where the school official would be held
liable. Qualified immunity plus is an appropriate standard for school
officials—especially classroom teachers. They should have a broader
shield than other government actors because their principal role is not
law enforcement but rather educating the youth. However, courts should
explicitly state that school officials are granted a higher protection from
civil suit than other government officials. Otherwise, school officials will
be granted qualified immunity plus but courts will refer to the standard as
qualified immunity. This could cause a slippery slope where other
government officials asserting qualified immunity could be granted the
additional protections of qualified immunity plus. Inversely, the civil
rights protections offered by § 1983 actions could be weakened because
school officials are offered qualified immunity plus, but it is termed
merely “qualified immunity.”
The two points from the preceding paragraphs—that in Safford the
Court distanced itself from the mere reasonableness standard and that
school officials now are given qualified immunity plus—are illustrative
of my principal thesis that qualified immunity is a poor fit with school
search law. The Court may resolve this problem in two ways. First, it
could explicitly abandon the rationale of T.L.O., rely on reasonable
suspicion for school searches, and require teachers to remain informed of
Fourth Amendment law. This is a poor solution because it places an
unrealistic expectation on teachers. Second, the Court (or Congress)
could declare that qualified immunity does not fit with school search
standards and provide qualified immunity plus. Rather than possibly
weakening civil rights protections by granting greater protections than
qualified immunity should, the courts should decide that school
officials—particularly teachers—are due absolute immunity in § 1983
actions regarding school searches. This proposal is logical due to
alternative remedies in school settings, such as the intense political
pressure parents place on school boards to adopt policies and procedures
to protect students and the relative ease of firing administrators and
teachers for civil rights violations. 6

6. Documentation of these remedies is beyond the scope of this paper. Consequently, I
assume that they exist and help to justify removing teachers from § 1983 school search cases.

313] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN SCHOOL SEARCH CASES

315

Part II discusses the Safford decision and the law established by
T.L.O. Part III lays out the history and current state of § 1983 actions and
the defense of qualified immunity. Part IV demonstrates that applying
qualified immunity to school search standards is problematic. Part V
specifically shows how qualified immunity actually provides qualified
immunity plus in school search cases, and Part VI outlines other issues
that arise from the problems identified in Part IV. Finally, Part VII
concludes that granting teachers absolute immunity provides a better
solution than adopting the reasonable suspicion standard.
II. SAFFORD AND T.L.O.
Safford was a significant case because it was the first time the Court
applied the test it set out in T.L.O. This section first describes T.L.O. It
then lays out the facts of Safford. Lastly, it discusses the Court’s Safford
opinion and the concurring in part and dissenting in part opinions.
A. Significant Legal Background
The principal precedent-setting case for Safford was New Jersey v.
T.L.O. 7 However, prior to T.L.O., the Supreme Court laid the
groundwork for § 1983 actions to be filed against teachers and school
administrators in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District by stating that neither “students [n]or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.” 8 Tinker’s guaranteeing of First Amendment rights to
students established precedent for the protections of other fundamental
rights in schools, such as Fourth Amendment rights regarding searches.
In T.L.O., the Court initially granted certiorari to determine whether
the exclusionary rule 9 applies in criminal proceedings when an unlawful
search was conducted by a school official. 10 However, the Court ordered
re-arguments focusing on the standard for determining the lawfulness of
searches performed by school officials. 11 T.L.O. was a high school
student that had been caught smoking in the girls’ bathroom by a
teacher. 12 When T.L.O. denied she had been smoking, the assistant

7. 469 U.S. 325.
8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
9. The exclusionary rule “excludes or suppresses evidence [in a criminal proceeding]
obtained in violation of an accused person’s constitutional rights.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 606
(8TH ed. 2004).
10. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
11. Id. at 327–28.
12. Id. at 328.
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principal opened her purse and pulled out a package of cigarettes. 13
When he removed the cigarettes, the administrator saw a package of
rolling papers, which caused him to suspect that T.L.O. had marijuana in
her purse. He then conducted a second, more extensive search of the
purse and found “a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of
empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an
index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money,
and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana dealing.” 14 In a
subsequent juvenile delinquency proceeding, T.L.O. sought to suppress
the results of the search under the exclusionary rule, claiming her Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated by the school administrator’s
search. 15
The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress evidence, and
“found T.L.O. to be a delinquent.” 16 The appellate court reversed on
Fifth Amendment grounds, and the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed
both lower-court decisions and ordered suppression of the items based on
the Fourth Amendment. 17 After rehearing arguments, the U.S. Supreme
Court established a reasonableness standard for searches of students by
school officials. 18 It held that the search of T.L.O.’s purse was
reasonable and, thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 19
The first issue the Court addressed was whether Fourth Amendment
protections applied to unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by
school officials. 20 The Court cited several cases that applied Fourth
Amendment protections to searches conducted by other state actors such
as building inspectors, 21 health inspectors, 22 and firemen. 23 It then held
that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches by school officials 24
based on the policy that the Fourth Amendment protects people from any
state actor, regardless of whether the actor’s goal is criminal
investigation or other regulatory purposes. 25
After determining that the Fourth Amendment applies to school
searches, 26 the Court addressed the issue of what standard should be
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 341–342.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 333.
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Marshall v. Barlow’s, 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
Id. at 335.
Throughout this Note, I use the term “school searches” to signify searches conducted by
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applied to determine whether a school search violates the Fourth
Amendment. The Court acknowledged the competing interests that
students have some expectation of privacy at school (privacy interest),
while the school, on the other hand, has a pressing interest in
discipline—which interest has increased over the years. 27
In its key reasoning, the Court pointed out the importance of
informality and flexibility when establishing rules that teachers and
administrators will have to follow. 28 The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not require school officials to “obtain a [search]
warrant before searching a student who is under their authority,” and that
the level of suspicion does not have to reach the level of probable
cause. 29 Rather, school officials’ actions should be judged on a mere
reasonableness standard in a two-part test: (1) was there a reasonable
expectation the search would discover evidence of wrongdoing; and (2)
were “the measures adopted . . . reasonably related to the objectives of
the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction”? 30 In adopting a reasonableness
standard rather than probable cause, the Court acknowledged that
teachers should not be required to follow the complex and ever changing
rules governing probable cause: “By focusing attention on the question
of reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school
administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of
probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to
the dictates of reason and common sense.” 31
In applying this new standard to the facts in T.L.O., the Court held
that two searches occurred: one for cigarettes based on the suspicion of
the teacher catching T.L.O. smoking, and a second for drug
paraphernalia based on what the administrator saw when he removed the
cigarettes. 32 The Court held that both searches were reasonable in their
inception and in the manner in which they were carried out. 33
There were two concurrences and Justice Brennan dissented in part,
ardently arguing that the Court had established an unclear standard in a
realm of the law—school law—where clear standards are desirable.
Brennan argued against a balancing test and for probable cause to be the
school officials.
27. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
28. Id. at 339–40.
29. Id. at 340–41.
30. Id. at 342. The Court failed to elaborate on exactly how the age and sex of the student
affects the analysis. As Safford also failed to address this subject, it is not within the scope of this
Note and will not receive further consideration.
31. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 343–44.
33. Id. at 346–47.
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standard of whether school searches are constitutional 34 because teachers
will not be able to easily understand what the reasonableness standard
entails. 35
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. 36 Primarily,
Stevens argued that the Court should have decided the case on its
original petition for certiorari and not ordered a rehearing on a different
issue. 37 One footnote towards the end of his decision, however, directly
addressed the issue that would eventually come before the Court in
Safford. After arguing for a more stringent standard for school official
searches, Justice Stevens noted:
One thing is clear under any standard—the shocking strip searches
that are described in some cases have no place in the schoolhouse. “It
does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of
a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some
magnitude.” 38
Given Justice Stevens’s strong language regarding school strip
searches, it is surprising that over two decades passed before the Court
heard a case on this topic.
B. Facts and Procedural History
The facts surrounding Safford occurred in the fall of 2003 in Safford,
Arizona. By way of background, Safford is a small community roughly
170 miles southeast of Phoenix. In 2003, the population was around
10,000. 39 Savana Redding was an eighth grade student at Safford Middle
School, which educates around 600 students from sixth, seventh, and
eighth grades. 40 While the school had experienced issues with drugs over
the years, the record before the appellate courts was both incomplete and
contested by Redding, thus the courts did not allow prior incidents
regarding drug possession by other students to carry any weight in their
decisions. 41
34. Id. at 357–58 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Id. at 365–66.
36. Id. at 370–386.
37. Id. at 371.
38. Id. at 382 n.25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Doe v.
Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92–93 (7th Cir. 1980)) (internal citations omitted).
39. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
40. See id.
41. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 504 F.3d 828, 829 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), en banc, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct.
2633 (2009). The school rule banning any medications, both prescription and over-the-counter, was
put in place a couple of years before this incident because a student had ingested pills at school and
become violently ill to the point that he was hospitalized. Brief of Appellant at 3, Safford, 504 F.3d

313] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN SCHOOL SEARCH CASES

319

In August at the back-to-school dance, several teachers and staff
members noticed the smell of alcohol emanating from a rowdy group of
students, which included Savana Redding, Marissa Glines, and Jordan
Romero. 42 During the dance alcohol and cigarettes were found in the
girls’ restroom of the school. 43
On October 1, roughly six weeks after the dance, Jordan Romero and
his mother met with the school’s assistant principal Kerry Wilson.
Jordan’s mother was concerned because Jordan had been extremely sick
the night before, and he claimed the cause was pills that he had received
from a classmate, 44 who was presumably neither Marissa nor Savana. 45
In this meeting Jordan told Wilson that he had attended a party at Savana
Redding’s house before the back-to-school dance, that alcohol was
served at the party, and that Savana’s parents knew of the alcohol and
failed to take any steps to prevent it from being served. 46 Next, he
reported that “certain students were bringing drugs and weapons on
campus.” 47
One week later, on October 8, Jordan approached Wilson before
school started and gave Wilson a white pill. 48 He stated that Marissa had
given it to him and that “students were planning to take the pills at
lunch.” 49 Wilson took the pill to the school nurse, Peggy Schwallier, who
identified it as prescription strength, 400-milligram ibuprofen. 50 When
school began, Wilson pulled Marissa from her class, and the teacher of
the class gave him a planner that had been in the desk adjacent to
Marissa and apparently belonged to Marissa. 51 When the planner was
opened it contained “several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a
cigarette.” 52 Marissa denied ownership of the planner and its contents. 53
Once in his office, Wilson had a female administrative assistant,
Helen Romero, come into his office, and Wilson asked Marissa to turn
out her pockets. 54 Marissa did so and produced several white pills
828 (No. 05-15759).
42. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1075.
43. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
44. See id. at 2640.
45. Had Romero received the pill from one of these girls, one of the appellate courts likely
would have mentioned it. Furthermore, a third student was questioned as a suspected pill distributor
but not strip-searched on the day Marissa and Savana were searched. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1077 n.5.
46. See id. at 1076.
47. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640 (citation omitted).
48. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076.
49. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
50. Id.
51. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076.
52. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2638.
53. Id. at 2640.
54. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076.
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identical to the one Jordan had previously given Wilson, a blue pill later
identified as an over-the-counter 200 milligram anti-inflammatory called
naproxen, 55 and a razor blade. 56 Wilson asked where the blue pill came
from, and Marissa replied, “‘I guess it slipped in when she gave me the
IBU 400s.’” 57 After a follow-up question Marissa clarified that the “she”
who had given her the pills was Savana Redding. 58
Next, Wilson had Ms. Romero accompany Marissa to the nurse’s
office so a strip search could be conducted. 59 The strip search entailed
Marissa pulling up her shirt and pulling out her bra and shaking it. 60 She
also removed her pants and pulled out the waistband of her underpants
and shook them. 61 No additional contraband was found. 62
After this search, Mr. Wilson summoned Savana to his office.
Savana was a thirteen-year-old honor student 63 who “had never
[previously] been disciplined for any infraction of school rules.” 64 The
information that gave rise to Mr. Wilson’s suspicion of Savana was (1)
Jordan’s statement that the alcohol had been served at a party at Savana’s
home and (2) Marissa’s statement that Savana had provided her the
pills. 65 However, Marissa had not stated when Savana allegedly gave her
the pills nor if she knew of any additional pills in Savana’s possession. 66
When Wilson first showed Savana the day planner, Savana admitted
that she owned the day planner, but not any of its contents. 67 She stated
that she had lent the planner to Marissa a few days earlier because
Marissa wanted a place to hide “cigarettes, a lighter and some jewelry.” 68
Savana denied any knowledge or possession of the pills. 69 She then
consented to a search of her backpack which was conducted by Ms.

55. The blue pill was a generic version of the over the counter anti-inflammatory Aleve.
56. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
57. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 504 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, en banc, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633
(2009).
58. Id.
59. The Court addressed use of the term “strip search,” and stated that several terms could be
used for the search that occurred in this case, but strip search was accurate and sufficiently served
the Court’s purposes. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
60. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1077.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1074.
64. Id. at 1077.
65. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
66. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1083. Indeed Wilson’s failure to ask Marissa follow-up questions
regarding these points was pointed out by the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision. Id.
67. Id. at 1075 n.2.
68. Id.
69. Redding, 129 S. Ct., 2638.
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Romero; no contraband was found. 70 Wilson then ordered a strip search
of Savana. 71 In the nurse’s office, Savana was initially asked to remove
her coat, shoes, and socks; nothing was found in these items. 72 She was
next asked to remove her T-shirt and stretch pants—neither of which had
any pockets. 73 Again, nothing was found. Finally, she was asked to pull
out her bra and then her underpants waistband and shake them. 74 No
additional pills were discovered. 75 Savana put her clothes back on and
returned to Mr. Wilson’s office. 76
When Savana’s mother learned of the search, she requested a
meeting with Mr. Wilson. Afterwards she filed a § 1983 civil rights
action against the school district, Wilson, the administrative assistant,
Romero, and the school nurse, Schwallier. 77 Ms. Redding filed the §
1983 action in the Federal District Court of Arizona. 78 The court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. 79
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a split decision. 80 Subsequently,
the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc and reversed the initial threejudge panel. The en banc court held that the search constituted a
constitutional violation and Mr. Wilson was not entitled to qualified
immunity. 81
C. The Court’s Safford Decision
1. The strip search
The Court held that the strip search of Savana Redding was
unreasonable and violated her Fourth Amendment rights, but that the
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 82 Consequently, Redding
did not recover any damages, fees, or expenses. Justice Souter wrote the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1075.
77. Id. at 1077.
78. Id.
79. It is unclear what happened regarding the school district as a defendant. The Supreme
Court remanded regarding the school district because the Ninth Circuit case did not address it at all.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
80. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 504 F.3d 828, 836 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, en banc, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633
(2009).
81. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
82. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2637–38.

322

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 24

majority opinion in Safford. Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito joined in the majority. 83 Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg each joined the majority opinion insofar as it found the search a
Fourth Amendment violation, but dissented over whether qualified
immunity should apply. 84 Justice Thomas, conversely, concurred in
granting qualified immunity and dissented over whether the search
constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. 85
In reaching a decision as to whether the strip search of Savana
Redding violated her Fourth Amendment rights, the Court first addressed
the standard that would judge the search. The Court provided a brief
discussion on probable cause—stating it is the customary standard
applied to searches and that the Court has struggled in clearly defining
it. 86 The Court defined probable cause, for purposes of searches, as
whether there is a “‘fair probability’ or a ‘substantial chance’ of
discovering evidence of criminal activity.” 87 The Court relied on T.L.O.
for the proposition that the standard governing school searches is
somewhat lower than probable cause, and defined the standard, which
justified searches by school officials if there existed “a moderate chance
of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” 88
The Court’s application of the T.L.O. standard is confusing because
it alternates between the language of T.L.O. and the traditional probable
cause/reasonable suspicion used in other Fourth Amendment cases. The
Court held that the information known to Wilson was sufficient “to
justify a search of Savana’s backpack and outer clothing.” 89 However, on
the issue of the strip search the Court reasoned that “both subjective and
reasonable societal expectations . . . requir[e] distinct elements of
justification.” 90 Thus, it appears that the standard established is: a
moderate suspicion of wrongdoing justifies any search by a school
official, except a strip search. In instances where the student is required
to remove any article of clothing that will expose undergarments, some
additional justification would be required. Without citing any authority,
the Court reverted back to probable cause/reasonable suspicion analysis

83. Id. at 2637.
84. Id. at 2644–45.
85. Id. at 2646–58.
86. Id. at 2639.
87. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 244 n.14 (1983)) (internal citations
omitted).
88. Id. It should be noted that while the Court often uses the language from the rules
regarding school searches and police searches interchangeably, in a school search all that is required
is suspicion of a violation of school rules. However, for a police search there must be suspicion of
criminal activity.
89. Id. at 2641.
90. Id.
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to support the rule that more than a mere suspicion is required for a strip
search; the Court reasoned that Savana possessed both a subjective belief
(demonstrated by her statement of being embarrassed, frightened, and
humiliated) and an objective belief (based on adolescent vulnerability)
that her privacy would not be invaded to the extent of a strip search. 91
Rather than simply state that strip searches require probable cause—
which would have provided a bright line rule but contradicted T.L.O. by
requiring school officials to become versed in probable cause case law—
the Court reverted mid-paragraph back to the T.L.O. rule by quoting that
the search, as executed, must be “‘reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ . . . The
scope will be permissible, that is, when it is ‘not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’” 92
In applying this second prong of the T.L.O. test, the Court considered the
type of drugs Wilson was searching for and the evidence that pills were
hidden in Savana’s underwear. 93 The Court held that the strip search was
unreasonable because the school officials were merely looking for overthe-counter and prescription-strength anti-inflammatory pills, and
because there was no evidence of hiding pills on one’s person in regards
to Savana specifically or of a general practice within the school. 94 At the
end of the analysis, the Court apparently attempted to clarify its
confusing language by stating a clear standard—reasonable suspicion—
for school strip searches. However, the paragraph that articulates this
standard describes it as in conformance with T.L.O. but fails to
acknowledge the difference between the common sense reasonableness
from T.L.O. and reasonable suspicion as used in other Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases.
The Court’s decision regarding the strip search is disappointing in
two regards. First, it failed to clearly follow the T.L.O. test. Doing so
would have provided lower courts some parameters on the vague second
prong of the test regarding the reasonableness of the scope of the search
given the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
Second, and more problematic, the Court failed to state whether the
reasonable suspicion required for a school strip search is derived from
T.L.O.—which considers age, sex, and the nature of the infraction—or is
the equivalent to the reasonable suspicion required by law enforcement
for temporary stops and searches under the Terry v. Ohio line of cases. 95

91. Id. at 2641–42.
92. Id. at 2642 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985)) (internal
citations omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Terry v. Ohio established reasonable suspicion as the standard for limited searches and
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Because “reasonable suspicion” is such a common term in Fourth
Amendment case law, school administrators must assume that the
reasonable suspicion in Safford is equivalent to the standard imposed on
law enforcement officers. Thus, the entire policy supporting T.L.O. of
not applying the complex probable cause standard to school officials is
circumvented because the reasonable suspicion standard is arguably just
as complex in the case law as that of probable cause. 96
2. Qualified immunity
The Court’s entire section on qualified immunity comprised less than
one page of the decision, even though this was the principal
disagreement between the majority and the Justices that dissented in part.
There is only one qualified immunity test for all government officials.
Consequently, the Court applied the same qualified immunity test to the
school officials in Safford that it applied earlier in the term in a case that
did not regard school law. 97 The Court defined qualified immunity as
immunity for government officials accused of performing
unconstitutional searches “‘where clearly established law does not show
that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.’” 98 It explained that
qualified immunity is not applicable if clear case law exists that holds the
type of search at issue to be unconstitutional. 99 Qualified immunity is
also not applicable in circumstances of “outrageous conduct.” 100
Furthermore, the Court stated that if the law sufficiently put government
officials on notice, then qualified immunity may not be appropriate even
if the government official’s conduct presents a “‘novel factual
circumstance.’” 101 Thus in order to successfully claim qualified
seizures performed by police officers as opposed to the higher standard of probable cause. 392 U.S.
1, 20–21 (1968). Since Terry, there have been a considerable number of cases that addressed the
reasonable suspicion standard. See, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147–48 (1972) (allowing
an officer to reach into a car and seize a weapon hidden on the body of a suspect, when knowledge
of the weapon was based on an informant); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1977)
(creating the bright-line rule, based on Terry, that an officer can order a driver out of a vehicle when
the stop was merely for a traffic violation).
96. Admittedly, T.L.O. does use the term “reasonable suspicion,” but a careful reading of the
case, or a simple search of the term reasonable, shows that the T.L.O. Court established a tort-like
reasonableness standard and not the reasonable suspicion standard commonly linked with Terry v.
Ohio. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337–43.
97. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting the rule from Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808,
822 (2009)). Pearson dealt with a drug task force’s warrantless arrest outside of a home and
subsequent search of the residence. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 813–14.
98. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2643 (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822).
99. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 US. 603, 615 (1999)).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). For example, if the duties and
rights are clearly defined by the Court, a “novel factual circumstance” will not guarantee that
qualified immunity is applicable.
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immunity, the school officials in Safford had to show that (1) there was
not clearly established case law holding similar facts analogous to this
case to be unconstitutional, (2) the strip search as conducted may later
have been found to be unconstitutional by dispassionate judges, but not
outrageously so, and (3) the general guiding principles of the law were
not established sufficiently to give notice that the “novel” facts regarding
the search in the case constituted a clear constitutional violation.
Regarding the first requirement, the Court held that there was
sufficient divergence in the case law to conclude no established law
existed. 102 The Court first cited the divergence of opinions from the
Ninth Circuit in this case. 103 This analysis is unhelpful to future courts
because a school administrator, in determining whether a search would
be appropriate, will not know in advance how a majority of judges on the
circuit where the school is located would rule on the specific facts
currently before the administrator. Next, the Court turned to the case law
on the topic. 104 It noted courts’ difficulty in applying the T.L.O. standard
and cited circuit court cases that dealt with strip searches. In Williams v.
Ellington “the Sixth Circuit upheld a strip search of a high school student
for a drug, without any suspicion that drugs were hidden next to her
body.” 105 In Thomas v. Roberts the Eleventh Circuit “grant[ed] qualified
immunity to a teacher and police officer who conducted a group strip
search of a fifth grade class when looking for a missing $26.” 106
The Court then held that qualified immunity should be granted
because the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, as well as a sizable minority of
the Ninth Circuit judges that heard Safford, all allowed strip searches
based on little to no suspicion; thus, the case law was not established that
a strip search violated the Fourth Amendment when the search was for
drugs and there was no reasonable suspicion that the student currently
had drugs hidden on her body. 107 The Court included the following
caveat to this type of reasoning that granted qualified immunity due to a
disagreement among judges:
We would not suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the
guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ. 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc)) (“[O]ther courts considering qualified immunity for strip searches have read T.L.O. as ‘a
series of abstractions, on the one hand, and a declaration of seeming deference to the judgments of
school officials, on the other . . . .’”).
105. Id. (citing Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 882–83 (6th Cir. 1991)).
106. Id. at 2643–44 (citing Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 2003)). For a brief
discussion of how informants now play a role in determining reasonable suspicion for strip searches
in schools, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Jacqueline Joy Cumming, Reliability of Student Informants
and Strip Searches, 231 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 1–4 (2008).
107. Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644.
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state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges,
disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically render the
law unclear if we have been clear. 108
This statement—given in an attempt to stave off what will surely
become the government’s argument in any qualified immunity case,
namely that the law is not established because some judges disagree—
will likely only further confuse school officials and judges because (1) it
is unclear if the final part of the sentence, stating that clarity by the
Supreme Court trumps any lower-court views, applies to the entire
sentence; and (2) it raises the question of whether the initial statement
about disuniform views not “guaranteeing” qualified immunity creates a
strong presumption in favor of qualified immunity; and (3) it leaves
unclear how many judges are needed to establish a significant enough
minority view to unsettle the law.
In sum, while the Court appeared to simply hold that qualified
immunity protects the defendants in this case and that this was a mere
run-of-the-mill qualified immunity case, the Court’s statement on how to
establish whether the law is unclear for qualified immunity purposes will
likely confound courts in their application of this standard.
D. The Dissent
Three Justices concurred in part and dissented in part to the Court’s
opinion: Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Thomas. Each
justice wrote an individual opinion as to their reasons for dissenting from
the majority opinion.
Justice Stevens did not address the Court’s questionable analysis of
the qualified immunity rule. He avoided the issue by stating the search
was obviously outrageous. 109 His opinion, which was joined by Justice
Ginsburg, noted that the Court was merely applying T.L.O. and not
altering it in any way. 110 Next, in a restatement of his T.L.O. footnote, 111
he argued that a strip search of a thirteen-year-old student by school
officials is clearly outrageous conduct. 112 Most interesting is Stevens’s
critique of the majority’s qualified immunity reasoning and rule
application. He absolutely rejected the proposition that courts should
consider a split of authority in determining whether there existed settled
law for qualified immunity purposes when the split arises from a
Supreme Court decision: “[T]he clarity of a well-established right should
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Supra text accompanying note 38.
Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2644 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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not depend on whether jurists have misread our precedents.” 113 He points
out that any time an authority split had been considered by the Court
regarding qualified immunity, it was to prevent officials from having to
“‘predict the future course of constitutional law.’” 114 However, since this
case was the straightforward application of T.L.O., a rule already in
existence, no new course was undertaken; consequently, a split of
authority should have no impact on the Court’s decision. 115
Justice Ginsburg ardently argued that “Wilson’s treatment of
Redding was abusive and it was not reasonable for him to believe that
the law permitted it.” 116 She obviously agreed with the majority’s finding
that the search violated Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights, but felt that
the violation was extreme enough that qualified immunity should not be
available to the school officials. 117 Rather than focus on the type of
search, as Stevens had, Ginsburg based her dissent on the absolute lack
of evidence that Savana was hiding pills on her body. She claimed the
search should have ended with an inspection of Savana’s backpack and
jacket pockets, and that anything beyond that clearly violated T.L.O. by
being “‘excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student
and the nature of the infraction.’” 118
Lastly, Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy opinion in which he argued
that the T.L.O. standard, as applied by the majority, “impose[d] a vague
and amorphous standard on school administrators. . . [and] grant[ed]
judges sweeping authority to second-guess” administrators. 119
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY HISTORY
A. § 1983 Actions
Today, § 1983 actions comprise the vast majority of civil rights
actions filed in federal courts and form the “backbone of federal civil
rights enforcement.” 120 Tens of thousands of § 1983 actions are filed
annually. 121 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a short statute that provides:

113. Id. at 2645.
114. Id. at 2645 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2646 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
119. Id. at 2646 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas’s
opinion is not discussed in depth because this Note focuses on qualified immunity and he focused on
the Fourth Amendment standard imposed by the Court. This is not meant to detract from the valid
argument he posed.
120. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS 14:7 (3d ed. 2009).
121. Id.

328

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 24

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 122
Congress originally passed § 1983 in 1871. It was intended, as part
of the Ku Klux Klan Act, 123 to provide a federal remedy for civil rights
abuses when states failed to act. 124 However, the section was utilized
very infrequently by litigants until the 1960s when the Court began to
open the § 1983 door by broadly interpreting “actions taken ‘under color
of law’” in Monroe v. Pape. 125
The Monroe Court reversed a dismissal of a § 1983 action.126
Monroe alleged that thirteen Chicago police had broken into his home in
the early morning without a search or arrest warrant. 127 They then made
him and others stand naked in the living room while a thorough search of
the home was conducted—which included “emptying drawers and
ripping mattress covers.” 128 After the search, Monroe was taken to the
police station and questioned for ten hours; he was denied the
opportunity to call a lawyer or family member. 129 After the questioning
he was released, and no charges were ever filed against him. 130 In
Monroe, the Court opened the door for future § 1983 actions by broadly
defining actions “under color of law” as “actions taken by state
government officials in carrying out their official responsibilities, even if
contrary to state law.” 131 It further encouraged future litigation by
holding that plaintiffs can file a § 1983 action in federal court without
first seeking redress through state remedies in state courts. 132

122. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
123. Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Ku Klux Klan Act), ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
124. SMOLLA, supra note 120, at 14:2.
125. 365 U.S. 167, 186 (1961) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2187, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16.);
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 1–2 (2d. ed. 2008).
While only a handful of § 1983 cases were filed between 1871 and the 1960, the statute still had a
huge impact on civil rights because Brown v. Board of Education was a § 1983 action. SMOLLA,
supra note 120, at 14:2.
126. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
127. Id. at 170.
128. Id. at 169.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 125, at 2 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173–74).
132. Id.
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have opened the § 1983 door
further. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Court held that plaintiffs
were not limited in bringing § 1983 actions against government officials,
but could also bring the actions against the municipalities that employed
the officials if the officials were carrying out an official policy 133 and if
the officials acted in good faith. 134 During this time the Court also held
that § 1983 actions could be filed for civil rights violations that occurred
under color of federal law, thus allowing § 1983 actions based on actions
by federal government actors. 135 The Court did eventually stop opening
the § 1983 door by holding that there is no respondeat superior regarding
municipalities; rather, a municipality can be liable under § 1983 only if
its “‘policy’ or ‘custom’” causes the injury. 136
The Court was not the only government entity that strengthened §
1983. Congress also encouraged § 1983 actions by passing the Civil
Rights Attorney Fees Award Act of 1976, which generally awards
attorneys fees in successful § 1983 actions. 137
It is interesting that the Rehnquist Court, which generally sought to
restrict broad holdings from the Warren Court, did not place any
significant restriction on § 1983 actions even though huge numbers of
these actions were filed annually. A possible explanation for this
anomaly was the Rehnquist Court’s preference for civil remedies over
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. 138
B. The Qualified Immunity Defense
Just as the Court opened the door to § 1983 civil rights actions, it
also created an affirmative defense to these actions, namely qualified
immunity. 139 The Court originally established the qualified immunity
defense in the 1967 case Pierson v. Ray. 140 In Pierson, which was
decided six years after the Court opened the § 1983 door in Monroe,
133. SCHWARTZ & URBONYA, supra note 125, at 2–3 (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of
Soc. Serv.s, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
134. Smolla, supra note 125, at 14:2 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980)).
135. Id. at 14:5 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)).
136. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
694) (providing a list of citations to plurality and concurring opinions to support the statement, “We
have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior.”).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006); Smolla, supra note 120, at 14:6.
138. This topic is not discussed at length in this paper, but I have written briefly on it
elsewhere. Eric Clarke, Note, Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey: The Ninth Circuit’s Expansion of the
Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Hearings Contradicts the Supreme Court’s Lopez-Mendoza
Decision, 2010 BYU L. REV. 51, 64–65.
139. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 671 (2009).
140. 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); see also Leong, supra note 139, at 671.
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fifteen clergymen were arrested in Mississippi after ignoring segregation
signs in a bus terminal. 141 They were charged with congregating “in a
public place under circumstances . . . that [may cause] a breach of the
peace” and refusing to move “when ordered to do so by a police
officer.” 142 The clergymen were convicted in a bench trial, but on appeal
a new trial was ordered. 143 In the subsequent trial all charges were
dropped. 144 The clergymen brought a § 1983 action against the judge
who convicted them and the arresting police officers. 145 A jury returned a
verdict in favor of the judge and police officers. 146 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed as to the judge, granting him absolute immunity, but reversed as
to the officers. 147 The circuit court noted that subsequent to the arrest, but
prior to this action, the Mississippi law allowing the arrest had been
declared unconstitutional. 148 Thus, even though the law was in effect at
the time of the arrest and the officers had been acting in good faith and
the officers had probable cause, they were liable for a § 1983
violation. 149 The Supreme Court affirmed the judicial immunity but
reversed the circuit court’s ruling regarding the officers. 150
The Court held that the affirmative defense of good faith and
probable cause, which was available to police officers under the common
law, was available in § 1983 actions. 151 The Court remanded for a new
trial in which a jury was to determine if “the officers reasonably believed
in good faith that the arrest was constitutional.” 152 In Pearson the Court
established a qualified immunity defense, though not explicitly calling it
this, for police officers based on subjective good faith and probable
cause—or in other words, on whether the officers had a reasonable, good
faith belief that their action was constitutional. 153 In subsequent cases the
Court provided two policy justifications for this early form of qualified
immunity: first, it was to protect government officials from civil
monetary actions when they acted in good faith, and second, it sought to

141. 386 U.S. 547, 549.
142. Id. at 549 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 549–50.
144. Id. at 550.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 550–51. The circuit court avoided such an unjust outcome in this case by ordering a
new trial due to bias-creating questioning of the clergy witnesses, which had been allowed, and by
holding that if a jury found the clergymen had gone to Mississippi planning on being arrested, then
they would have waived any claim of unlawful arrest. Id. at 551.
150. Id. at 557–558.
151. Id. at 557.
152. Id.
153. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 822–23 (2009).
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ensure that officials were not prevented from executing their “office[s]
with the requisite decisiveness and judgment”—or to prevent a “chilling
effect” on decision-making due to fear of losing one’s personal
property. 154
However, the Court eventually rejected the subjective good-faith
prong of qualified immunity analysis and began justifying qualified
immunity on the policy of resolving “‘insubstantial claims’ against
government officials . . . prior to discovery.” 155 In its 1982 decision
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 156 the Court fundamentally changed qualified
immunity by establishing a purely objective test. 157 By the time Harlow
was decided, qualified immunity was an established doctrine that applied
broadly to government officials and not solely to police officers. 158
When Harlow was argued the qualified immunity test had an objective
and subjective prong. The objective prong was whether the government
official “knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].” 159 The subjective prong was
whether the official “took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the [plaintiff].” 160
In Harlow the Court addressed whether qualified immunity was
proper for aides to President Richard Nixon in an action for unlawful
termination brought by an Air Force Officer. 161 The aides argued that in
order for qualified immunity to successfully allow “‘insubstantial
lawsuits to be quickly terminated,’” 162 specifically prior to trial, the
subjective good-faith prong of the qualified immunity test must be
eliminated. 163 The Court agreed. It eliminated good faith as a policy
justification of qualified immunity, stating that qualified immunity
sought to balance the need of allowing a “realistic avenue for vindication

154. Nicole B. Lieberman, Note, Post-Johnson v. Jones Confusion: the Granting of BackDoor Qualified Immunity, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 567, 568–69 (1997) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232, 241 (1974)).
155. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n.2 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982)).
156. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
157. Leong, supra note 139, at 672 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16, 818).
158. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (“For executive officials in general, however, our cases make
plain that qualified immunity represents the norm.”).
159. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (applying qualified immunity to school
board members), quoted in Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
160. Id., quoted in Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
161. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. The Court also addressed whether absolute immunity was
proper. Id.
162. Id. at 814 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978)) (internal brackets
omitted).
163. Id. at 814–15.
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of constitutional guarantees” 164 against the various social costs accrued
when suit is brought against government officials, namely “expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, . . .
the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office[, and] . . .
the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of all but the
most resolute, or the most irresponsible public officials, in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.’” 165 The Court rejected the goodfaith prong because, as a question of fact, it prevented qualified
immunity from being applied early on in summary judgments and
because broad and distracting discovery was often required to prove
good or bad faith. 166 Thus, the Court held that to establish qualified
immunity, a government official only had to establish that her conduct
did “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” 167
The Harlow decision required that the Court redefine the
justifications for the qualified immunity defense. Before Harlow,
qualified immunity was often referred to as “good faith” immunity,168
and Harlow was significant because it abandoned the subjective element
of qualified immunity. What is often overlooked is that the Court had to
completely redefine the policy justifications for qualified immunity in
abandoning its subjective element. The Harlow Court essentially stated
that qualified immunity was principally meant to prevent government
distraction from baseless lawsuits by facilitating early dismissal of such
actions. 169 This policy has been cited by the Court in subsequent cases
and remains the principal justification for qualified immunity. 170 Thus,
rather than merely protect government actors from having to pay civil
damages, qualified immunity is meant also to protect them from having
to mount time-consuming defenses to civil actions. It is “an entitlement
not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation” and thus provides
“an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” 171
C. Saucier v. Katz: Sequencing and Reasonableness

164. Id. at 814 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 506).
165. Id. at 814 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
166. Id. at 816–17.
167. Id. at 818.
168. Id. at 815.
169. See id. at 814–15.
170. See, e.g., Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (“[T]he goal of qualified immunity
[is] to ‘avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial
claims on summary judgment.’” (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
171. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (italics omitted), quoted in Saucier, 533
U.S. at 200–01.
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The test for qualified immunity has not changed since Harlow, 172 but
the Court has taken efforts to protect the policy established in Harlow
and ensure that judges can apply qualified immunity early on in
litigation. 173 For two decades following Harlow, the Court struggled with
the question of whether the two prongs that currently comprise the
qualified immunity test must be analyzed in any particular order. 174 The
Court reached the conclusion to this question in Saucier v. Katz by
stating that qualified immunity had a two-prong test that must be applied
in order. The first prong is whether “the facts alleged show the
[government official’s] conduct violated a constitutional right.” 175 Then,
only if that prong is met, the court should ask whether the constitutional
right was clearly established, or in other words “whether it would be
clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation.” 176 This second prong boils down to whether the official was
put on notice by existing law that her act was unlawful.
While the Court based this sequencing requirement on the need to
clarify the law regarding the violation of constitutional rights in order to
put officials on notice, the decision did not explicitly state this rational.
Interestingly, even though prior cases had hinted at sequencing and a
circuit split existed over whether there was a mandatory sequence, 177 the
Court only dedicated one paragraph to establishing and justifying the
sequencing rule. 178 It merely stated that sequencing was necessary and
“one reason” supporting sequencing was “the law’s elaboration from
case to case.” 179 No other justifications were given. This single reason
has been widely accepted as the policy justification. 180 In order to put
172. In the 2009 decision of Pearson v. Callahan, the Court quoted the holding from Harlow
as the qualified immunity rule. 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“The doctrine of qualified immunity
protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).
173. See discussion infra Part III.C.
174. See Leong, supra note 139, at 672–73.
175. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
176. Id. at 202.
177. See Leong, supra note 139, at 672–73.
178. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil
Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53, 58 (2008)
(“[T]he Court has trumpeted, often explicitly, the importance of norm-announcement over the
competing principle of constitutional avoidance, focusing on the value of creating clear rules to
guide lower courts and public officials . . . .”); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816
(2009) (“This two step procedure, the Saucier Court reasoned, is necessary to support the
Constitution’s ‘elaboration from case to case’ and to prevent constitutional stagnation. ‘The law
might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the
law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.’”
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government officials on notice, courts need to establish the law by
making determinations of what conduct is unconstitutional. 181
While Saucier is generally only cited for its sequencing rule, the bulk
of the decision addresses whether qualified immunity is applicable as a
separate standard when the overarching issue of a case is the
reasonableness of a government official’s actions. 182 In Saucier, Katz
was arrested and alleged undue force was used when he was shoved into
a police van. 183 The district court denied the government’s argument that
qualified immunity required summary judgment on the excessive force
claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 184 It held that because an officer’s use
of excessive force was governed by a reasonableness standard (whether
the force was reasonable in the situation) and qualified immunity also
relies on a reasonableness standard in its second prong (“if a reasonable
officer could have believed, in light of the clearly established law, that
his conduct was lawful”), then the reasonableness at issue in both rules
was identical. Because it was the basis for the cause of action, a jury
should decide the reasonableness question. 185 This holding by the Ninth
Circuit consequently implied that qualified immunity would not be
grounds for summary judgment any time an excessive-force claim was
brought before a court.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. 186 Six justices agreed
that qualified immunity was still applicable in instances when the cause
of action at issue turned on the reasonableness of the defendant’s
actions. 187 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained that
reasonableness regarding excessive force was governed by a test that
balanced several factors, 188 but reasonableness regarding qualified
immunity asked the separate question of whether the officer had a
reasonable misunderstanding of the law. 189 Thus, under the second prong
of qualified immunity, a judge is to determine whether the government
official who violated a constitutional right did so because, due to a
reasonable misunderstanding of the law, she thought her action was
lawful. 190
(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201) (internal citations omitted)).
181. See supra note 180.
182. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 197–216 .
183. Id. at 198.
184. Id. at 199.
185. Id. at 199–200.
186. Id. at 196
187. Id.
188. Id. at 205.
189. Id. at 202–04.
190. This could be termed the “objective legal reasonableness” test. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (“Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be
held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the ‘objective legal

313] QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN SCHOOL SEARCH CASES

335

Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer dissented. Justice Ginsburg
argued that qualified immunity and excessive force “both hinge on the
same question,” and the Court’s decision “holds large potential to
confuse” lower courts. 191 She disagreed with the Court’s splitting of
objective reasonableness into two parts, where the legality of the act
applies to qualified immunity and is separate from the actual action
taken. She would have rather held that the two-part qualified immunity
test outlined in prior cases was inapplicable to excessive-force cases. 192
The Court recently overturned the Saucier sequencing in Pearson v.
Callahan. 193 In this unanimous decision the Court rejected mandatory
sequencing of the qualified immunity prongs. 194 Otherwise, Pearson
does not discuss qualified immunity in detail. The Court relied on the
second prong of the qualified immunity test to hold that police officers
did not violate clearly established law when they entered a residence
without a warrant based on the consent-once-removed doctrine, which
had already been adopted in other jurisdictions but not yet by the
Supreme Court. 195 The Court has not addressed the reasonableness issue
from Saucier in subsequent decisions.
D. Qualified Immunity Today
A summary of qualified immunity as the rule currently exists will be
helpful before moving on to discuss why it does not fit with the school
search rule established in T.L.O. and Safford. Today, qualified immunity
protects government officials from suit and civil liability if they have not
been given constructive notice that any particular action is unlawful. 196
Because it offers protection from suit, government officials can
immediately file an interlocutory appeal when summary judgment is
denied on qualified immunity grounds. 197
Qualified immunity provides protection from the “‘hazy border’”
between permitted and unlawful conduct. 198 The general rule is that
qualified immunity protects government officials if “‘their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonableness’ of the action . . . .” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982))).
191. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 214.
193. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
194. Id. at 818.
195. Id. 822–23.
196. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206; See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815. The term “constructive” is not
used in the Supreme Court cases, but I use it here because it accurately portrays the rule.
197. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (2009).
198. Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v.
Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997), quoted in Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.
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reasonable person would have known.’” 199 The rule has been broken
down into two prongs. The first prong is whether “‘the facts alleged
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.’” 200 The
second prong is “‘whether the right was clearly established . . . in light of
the specific context of the case.’” 201 The actual test used to determine the
second prong is “the ‘objective legal reasonableness of the action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the
time it was taken.’” 202 Judges can determine which prong to address
first. 203 Generally, this will only matter when one of the prongs dictates
that qualified immunity should be granted, in which instances a judge
may grant summary judgment after only analyzing that specific prong.
IV. THE DOUBLE REASONABLENESS STANDARD IS INAPPLICABLE IN
SCHOOL SEARCHES
A. The T.L.O. Reasonableness Standard
1. The Court has correctly determined that probable cause is not the
appropriate standard for school searches
In T.L.O., the Court correctly established a reasonableness standard
to govern school searches rather than probable cause. While school
searches are generally conducted by administrators, there are times when
it may be preferable for a teacher to conduct the search. It would be
absolutely unrealistic to expect teachers to remain abreast of probable
cause law because the law is complex and changes regularly. Indeed, law
students spend the bulk of the criminal procedure course studying
probable cause and reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.
Peace officers undergo a similar, extensive training regarding probable
cause and Fourth Amendment standards; they also must receive
continuing education because this area of the law regularly changes. 204
The judiciary expects police officers to remain familiar with probable
cause law because they apply the probable cause standard to their
decisions on a regular basis. 205 School teachers and, to a lesser extent,
199. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
200. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
201. Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
202. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 822. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999)).
203. Id. at 818.
204. Chief Ken Wallentine, Lecture at BYU Law School (on or about October 6, 2009).
205. See, e.g., Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey 536 F.3d 1012 1016–19 (9th 2008) en banc
(holding that officers had egregiously violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the residence of a
suspected undocumented immigrant because of case law establishing the unconstitutionality of
searches and seizures inside a home). But see Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (“Likewise,
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administrators, on the other hand, cannot be expected to remain aware of
Fourth Amendment search standards. They do not undergo an extensive
training on the subject, and may not receive any training on the Fourth
Amendment in their preparatory studies to earn a teaching certificate. 206
Teacher training should focus on other areas that will improve students’
educational experiences. Teachers should not have to spend time learning
Fourth Amendment law—especially in continuing education situations
where time in seminars replaces time in the classroom with students.
However, if the law did require that teachers remain abreast of Fourth
Amendment law, some continuing education would have to be devoted
annually to this subject. Dedicating such valuable continuing education
time to Fourth Amendment law would negatively impact students by
eliminating more necessary and useful training opportunities for
teachers.
Because the majority of school searches are conducted by school
administrators, proponents of a higher school search standard may argue
that the ever evolving reasonable suspicion, or even probable cause, are
appropriate standards for school searches. After all, administrators are
expected to follow changes in the law much more closely than teachers,
and they are required generally to take a class that covers students’ First
and Fourth Amendment rights before earning an administrator
certificate. 207 Furthermore, in conferences administrators have the
opportunity to discuss current legal matters with one another. 208
This argument fails because school search law would still apply to
teachers in addition to administrators. As long as teachers are able to
conduct searches—which is necessary due to the many possible
scenarios that can arise in modern classroom—reasonableness and not
probable cause should be the standard. Courts could adopt a lower
standard for teacher searches than school administrator searches; 209
however, such a standard would be very difficult to apply due to the
difficulty of classifying some staff members as either administrators or
teachers. Furthermore, this proposed rule may encourage teachers, who
search and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and
who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of ‘probable cause.’”).
The fact that the Gates Court held police officers to a lower standard speaks to the slippery slope that
threatens § 1983 actions if some government employees are given increased protections under
qualified immunity than those traditionally given to law enforcement.
206. For example, as a former elementary school teacher, I never received any training on the
subject.
207. See, e.g., ARIZONA DEP’T OF EDUC. – CERTIFICATION UNIT, REQUIREMENTS FOR
PRINCIPAL
CERTIFICATE,
PREKINDERGARTEN
–
12,
pt.
6,
available
at
http://www.ade.state.az.us/certification/requirements/
admin/RequirementsforPrincipalCertificate.pdf (requiring at least three credit hours of school law).
208. Professor Scott Ellis Ferrin, Lecture at BYU Law School (on or about October 21, 2009).
209. This alternative was originally made by Professor Scott Ellis Ferrin of BYU.
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would have higher protections, to conduct searches rather than having
better trained administrators conduct them.
2.
The T.L.O. Court correctly concluded that common sense
reasonableness is the appropriate standard for school searches
The T.L.O. Court also correctly defined reasonableness for school
search purposes as “the dictates of reason and common sense.” 210 The
Court could have defined reasonableness in school searches as
reasonable suspicion. While the Court did provide a specific two-prong
test (“whether the . . . action was justified at its inception . . . [and]
whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified” the search 211 ), it did not state that
“reasonable suspicion” was required. 212 Reasonable suspicion is a term
of art in Fourth Amendment law and has its own set of standards that,
like probable cause, are often altered or adjusted by the courts. 213 By
requiring reasonableness defined by “common sense” rather than
reasonable suspicion as defined by the courts, the T.L.O. Court affirmed
the policy that school officials should not be expected to follow the
intricacies of Fourth Amendment law. 214
B. The Second Prong— Reasonableness Prong—of the Qualified
Immunity Test Directly Contradicts the Reasonableness Required in
T.L.O.
Qualified immunity does not fit with T.L.O. because qualified
immunity looks at whether the law effectively put the government actor
on notice that her actions would violate a constitutional right, while
T.L.O. rejects the notion that teachers should be required to remain
abreast of the law. 215 Consequently, teachers could never be put on
notice by the law and will always be protected by qualified immunity.

210. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
211. Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
212. Id. at 342.
213. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2009) (holding that reasonable
suspicion of dangerousness is the appropriate standard for vehicle searches and rejecting the
previous bright-line rule of always allowing searches of a vehicle incident to an arrest).
214. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
215. The Court has used common sense in other school law areas rather than more formalistic
legal approaches. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (referring to its holding that
some, minimal due process is due to students suspended from school for less than ten days as
“requirements which are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school principal would impose upon
himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions”).
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This changes qualified immunity into absolute immunity in school search
cases.
The second-prong of the qualified immunity test does not explicitly
rely on reasonableness; it addresses whether the constitutional right at
issue was clearly established to the extent that the official was put on
notice that her actions would be unlawful. 216 However, the test used to
apply this prong is whether a reasonable official would have been aware
of the unlawfulness of the action. 217 Thus, we can refer to this as a
reasonable awareness of the current state of the law.
On the surface qualified immunity reasonableness (which looks at
the actor’s awareness of the law) and school search awareness under
T.L.O. (which looks at common sense) are based on different standards
and do not conflict. The situation is the same as it was in Saucier, where
the Court held that two reasonableness tests could be applied because
they were based on different considerations. 218 In light of the clear
differences between the reasonableness standards, it is no wonder that
none of the opinions in Safford addressed whether there was any conflict
between the qualified immunity and T.L.O. standards.
However, the qualified immunity reasonableness standard directly
conflicts with the T.L.O. reasonableness standard because it requires
school officials, to some extent, to be aware of the status of the law. But
T.L.O. was based on the policy of not requiring school officials to remain
abreast of the law. T.L.O. absolutely relies on the need to have a standard
which teachers can be held accountable, without having to require Fourth
Amendment trainings. Yet, qualified immunity is based on reasonable
awareness of the current status of Fourth Amendment law.
C. Reasonable Plus Reasonable Equals an Excuse for Unreasonable
Actions
When the two reasonable tests from T.L.O. and qualified immunity
are considered together they lead to a near-absolute immunity for school
officials who conduct searches. In applying the second prong of qualified
immunity to school actors, who are not expected to be aware of changes
in the law, courts can only conclude that a reasonable awareness of the
law is virtually no awareness at all. Thus, qualified immunity will almost
always be granted. The only instances where school officials would not
be granted immunity would be when facts were analogous to cases that
are so well publicized that it would be reasonable to hold a school

216. Supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
217. Supra note 166 and accompanying text.
218. Supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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official accountable. Safford may be an example of this as it has been
well publicized due to the extreme facts. Thus, it could be expected for a
principal to know it is now unconstitutional to (1) order a strip search (2)
of a junior high student (3) searching for ibuprofen (4) when there is no
evidence the student currently has any pills hidden on her body. In
contrast, it is totally unrealistic to expect teachers to be aware of this new
rule in school law because the vast majority of them do not follow
Supreme Court decisions that affect school law.
V. THE UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF A DOUBLE REASONABLENESS
STANDARD: CHILLING FUTURE LAW SUITS
A possible dire consequence of the double reasonableness standard is
a chilling of the impetus to file § 1983 suits against school officials. If
lower courts accept Justice Stevens’s statement in his concurrence that
the Court is merely applying T.L.O. and not changing it in any way, 219
then the double reasonableness standard still applies, rather than
reasonable suspicion, and it will be virtually impossible for a plaintiff to
overcome qualified immunity.
The Court held in Safford that qualified immunity protected the
school officials; thus, the school officials were not expected to apply the
T.L.O. test and reach the same conclusion as eight members of the
Court—that the strip search was unreasonable. Consequently, it appears
that qualified immunity will generally provide immunity to any school
official unless (1) the facts of a case are extremely close to a prior case
where the action was held to be unconstitutional and (2) the prior case is
so widely known that it would be unreasonable for a school official to
not be aware of it. Safford is the only Supreme Court school search case
where a search was held unreasonable. Perhaps there are a handful of
circuit court cases that would be widely enough publicized in their
jurisdictions that teachers could be held accountable under the double
reasonableness standard. However, the vast majority of possible school
search scenarios are not covered by such case law. Thus, a § 1983 action
seeking damages for any novel school search will end with the district
court granting qualified immunity, and the plaintiff being left with no
viable argument to make on appeal.
Such decisions in cases with novel fact scenarios will have a chilling
effect on future § 1983 actions. First, and most importantly, the high
probability that school officials will be granted qualified immunity gives
plaintiffs a small likelihood of success. Consequently there is extremely
little incentive to pursue a lawsuit. Perhaps some plaintiffs seek some
219. Supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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emotional vindication rather than monetary damages. It is possible that
such plaintiffs would be willing to pay the costs and fees of a lawsuit in
hopes of getting a judge to rule that the action was unlawful under the
first prong of qualified immunity even if the second prong will prevent
the recovery of any damages. However, even this is unlikely because
after Pearson, courts are no longer required to consider the
constitutionality of the action at issue if it is clear the defendant’s
misunderstanding of the law was reasonable—which will almost always
be the case with the double reasonableness standard. Thus, judges will
likely simply find that qualified immunity applies based on the second
prong of the test and not reach any decision regarding the first prong.
Furthermore, the filing of future lawsuits will be chilled because any
appeal of a decision to grant qualified immunity must overcome the
daunting double reasonableness standard. If qualified immunity should
clearly be granted because it provides near-absolute immunity to school
officials who are not expected to know the current status of the law, then
appellate courts will simply affirm the lower judge’s decision and not
address the constitutionality of the action at issue.
Not only will this prevent the plaintiff from obtaining damages, but
more importantly, affirming based on the second prong of qualified
immunity will prevent future case law from being formed. For example,
if the Court had merely addressed the second prong of qualified
immunity in Safford, then we would not have case law declaring the type
of search that occurred in Safford unlawful. And, if the trial courts only
address the second prong, then the appellate courts will not be able to
review the constitutionality of the act, the first prong, because there
would be nothing to review.
VI. SAFFORD MAY FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ISSUE RATHER THAN
SOLVE IT
The preceding section assumed that Justice Stevens was correct in
his Safford concurrence—Safford in no way “altered the basic
framework” of T.L.O. 220 This section addresses a different conclusion—
that Safford significantly changed T.L.O. by establishing Terry-type
reasonable suspicion rather than common sense reasonableness as the
standard school officials are held to in school search cases. Presumably
Justice Stevens feared such an interpretation and thus dedicated the first
two paragraphs of his concurrence to emphatically stating that Safford
does not change T.L.O. If we accept, though, that Safford does create a
new standard (and thus find Stevens’s concurrence divergent from the
220. Supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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majority decision), then the Court has resolved the issue of near-absolute
immunity for school officials. But under this reading, the Court distances
itself from T.L.O.’s policy of not requiring teachers to remain abreast of
the status of Fourth Amendment law. If this is true, then the holding
effectually rejects this policy by (1) adopting a complex legal standard of
reasonable suspicion rather than common sense and (2) using other
circuit’s strip search cases to determine whether Wilson should be
granted qualified immunity in a way that would require Wilson to have
been aware of these cases in order to be aware what law was going to be
applied to him.
A. Safford Failed to Follow the “Common Sense” Reasonable Standard
from T.L.O.
Justice Souter, in writing for the Safford majority, failed to quote the
“common sense” reasonableness standard from T.L.O. Rather, he
interpreted T.L.O. as having applied some form of the “reasonable
suspicion” standard. 221 In an open acknowledgement that this is a
complicated standard, Justice Souter devoted the two paragraphs
immediately following the statement of this rule to stating that the Court
has “attempted to flesh out the” standard in “[a] number of our cases,”
but has failed to do so and thus reverted “to saying that the standards [of
reasonable suspicion] are ‘fluid concepts that take their substantive
content from the particular contexts’ in which they are being
assessed.” 222 He next attempted to define reasonable suspicion for school
searches—even though he had just finished describing it as indefinable—
”as a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.” 223
Consequently, it is now unclear to what standard teachers are to be
held. Is it (1) common sense of a reasonable teacher, (2) reasonable
suspicion under Terry, or (3) “a moderate chance of finding evidence of
wrongdoing”? 224 Rather than clarify and provide an example of how the
T.L.O. common sense reasonableness standard was to be applied, the
Court in Safford muddied the water by providing two potential standards
for courts to use, common sense reasonableness and reasonable
suspicion. If courts use the reasonable suspicion standard and the Terry
line of cases, then the double reasonableness problem may be solved.
However, school officials would then be required, under the second
prong of qualified immunity, to have some awareness of reasonable
suspicion law.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009).
Id. (quoting Ornealas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
Id.
Id. at 2638.
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B. Basing Qualified Immunity on Case Law from Other Circuits
The fact that the Court cited other circuit cases to justify granting
qualified immunity may lead lower courts to believe that the Court has
abandoned common sense reasonableness and rather is going to hold
school officials to the higher standard of the current status of the law.
Safford was a Ninth Circuit case, but the Court relied on cases from the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. The Court held that the law was unsettled
because other circuits (and a minority of judges in the Ninth Circuit en
banc Safford decision) felt that the strip search was reasonable under
T.L.O.
Using cases from around the country to address the qualified
immunity question necessarily implies that school officials are expected
to have a considerable awareness of the status of the law. As stated
earlier, the T.L.O. Court got it right when it based its holding on the
policy that teachers cannot be expected to remain abreast of current case
law. To rely on circuit court cases outside of the jurisdiction of Safford
School District all but eviscerates the T.L.O. policy. The reason to look
to other case law in qualified immunity analysis is not to determine the
current state of the law, but rather to determine if the government actor
defendants should have been reasonably aware of the current law. 225 By
relying on the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit cases, the Court has opened the
door for future courts to reject a qualified immunity defense because of
agreement among other circuits—even if the circuit governing the school
district has no case law on the issue. Not only would such decisions
completely reject the policy of not requiring extensive knowledge of the
law, but they would also be unjust because teachers simply cannot be
expected to follow the law in other circuits.
VII. THE TWO OPTIONS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE
Courts have two available options to resolve the issues left unclear
by Safford. First, lower courts could conclude that the Court has
abandoned common sense reasonableness and hold teachers and school
administrators to the reasonable suspicion standard. However, as this
Note has continually repeated, it defies common sense to expect teachers
to remain abreast of Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion law and
know how the cases, which most commonly surround law enforcement
activities, should apply to school searches.

225. Supra Part III.C.
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Thus I propose a second and more viable option. The Supreme Court
should accept another school search case to clarify the law by granting
teachers absolute immunity in school searches. Alternative remedies
exist to protect primary-school children’s Fourth Amendment rights, and
§ 1983 actions are not as necessary as they are in law enforcement or
other administrative spheres; school boards often face intense political
pressure from disgruntled parents and this pressure often impacts
decisions made by the school board, the superintendent, and school
principals. Thus, a better remedy than seeking monetary damages
directly from teachers or administrators is to implement formal
reprimand procedures. This is an efficient remedy because school
districts routinely call and speak with previous employers of school
officials. Once a teacher is fired for extremely questionable conduct, it is
unlikely that teacher will find other work in the education profession. 226
Because there is this alternative remedy, the Court, or Congress, would
be justified in granting teachers absolute immunity in § 1983 actions
regarding the Fourth Amendment.
Granting absolute immunity, and calling it absolute immunity, is the
right course of action because of the damage that results from the
alternative. Calling qualified immunity plus, which results from the
double reasonableness standard, mere qualified immunity increases the
protections of qualified immunity to such an extent it begins to weaken
student civil rights protections.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The T.L.O. common sense reasonableness standard, when combined
with the reasonableness prong in the affirmative defense of qualified
immunity grants teachers a near-absolute immunity. This is because
qualified immunity is based on a reasonable understanding of the law,
and under T.L.O., school officials are not expected to have any
understanding of the law. They cannot be put on notice by the law
because they are not expected to know it. The consequences are that
school officials are almost completely immune from § 1983 actions
regarding Fourth Amendment searches and that any filing of future
actions will be chilled by this immunity.
However, Safford may change the rule from common sense
reasonableness to Terry-like reasonable suspicion. This would solve the
near-absolute-immunity problem, but would also be bad law because it
would unrealistically expect school officials to remain abreast of Fourth

226. This assumes that school districts contact previous employers of teachers applying for
new jobs.
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Amendment law. Following this track could lead to school officials
being held liable for Forth Amendment violations in instances where
circuit courts on the other side of the country had established case law
that decreed the officials’ actions unconstitutional. Such a high level of
liability would be destructive to the education field and is the opposite of
what the Court sought to establish in T.L.O.
It is now unclear how the new standard for school searches will
affect qualified immunity. The best solution is to grant school officials
absolute immunity regarding school searches. However, as this is an
option open only to the U.S. Supreme Court or Congress. What will
likely occur is that lower courts will struggle and the law will become
unclear. Some courts will still apply the T.L.O. standard and school
officials before such judges will receive near-absolute immunity. Other
courts will likely apply reasonable suspicion, and in applying qualified
immunity will look to the ruling of circuit courts from across the country.
These judges will hold school officials to unrealistically high standard.
Thus, eventually the Supreme Court will be forced to re-address this
issue and hopefully will devise a clearer rule that can be applied
uniformly across the nation.
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